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NO [CONCRETE] HARM, NO FOUL?
ARTICLE III STANDING IN THE CONTEXT
OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
LAWS
Annefloor J. de Groot*
In the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, the Court held that a bare procedural violation of
a federal consumer protection statute is not enough to satisfy
Article III’s standing requirement because the alleged injury
is not sufficiently concrete. This decision resulted in a sizeable
circuit split regarding standing under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act, with some circuit courts interpreting
the holding as narrowing the scope of standing for consumer
protection claims, and others maintaining a broader
interpretation, allowing plaintiffs to obtain redress for
violations of consumer financial protections laws.
In its 2021 ruling in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the U.S.
Supreme Court attempted to clarify Spokeo, holding that if a
plaintiff does not suffer a real harm and a risk of future harm
does not materialize, then there is no concrete harm to confer
standing. TransUnion shifted the circuit split, still resulting
in inconsistencies among the courts but making it even harder
for plaintiffs to assert consumer financial protection claims
in federal courts. This Note explores TransUnion’s impact on
consumer financial protection claims, with a focus on the
evolution of the circuit split regarding standing under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and argues that the U.S.
Supreme Court wrongly decided TransUnion. A broader
approach giving deference to Congress would be more in line
with Article III, Spokeo, and Congress’s role as a factfinder,
and it would ensure judicial consistency and provide for
*
J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., 2019, University of
Georgia. I would like to thank Dean Kent Barnett for his thoughtful comments on this
Note.
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better representation of modern issues posing harm, or a real
risk of harm, to American consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario. You receive a debt collection
letter in the mail for credit-card debt that you defaulted on six
years ago. The letter looks enticing, as it tells you that you have
been pre-approved for a generous discount program designed to
save you money and encourages you to act quickly to maximize
your savings. Contrary to what you may be thinking, this letter is
not so generous after all. Instead, the governing statute of
limitations in your state provides that any claim to recover your
six-year-old debt is time-barred.1 The debt collection letter
conveniently includes a small disclaimer at the bottom indicating
this very fact. Given the misleading and deceptive nature of this
debt collection letter, you may think that you have standing to sue
for this clear violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).2 The FDCPA prohibits “false, deceptive, or misleading
representation[s]”3 and “unfair or unconscionable means”4 to
collect debt and provides consumer victims with a private right of
action against debt collectors.5 Should courts allow this type of
litigation to proceed?
This was precisely the situation that the plaintiffs faced in
Trichell v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., a recent Eleventh
Circuit case.6 In Trichell, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that the consumer plaintiffs failed to allege
a particularized, concrete injury required to demonstrate an
injury in fact to satisfy Article III standing.7 Because the plaintiffs
lacked standing, the debt collectors faced absolutely no

1 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-34(5) (2020) (providing for a six-year statute of limitations
period to commence an action for recovery of a debt).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p.
3 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
4 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
5 Id. § 1692f.
6 964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020).
7 Id. at 1002. “Under settled precedent, the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of
standing consists of three elements: the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, the
defendant must have caused that injury, and a favorable decision must be likely to redress
it.” Id. at 996 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
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repercussions for the statutory violations that they allegedly
committed.8
The Trichell court relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2016 landmark decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, in which the
Court held that a “bare procedural violation” of a federal consumer
protection statute is not enough to satisfy Article III’s standing
requirement because the alleged injury is not sufficiently
concrete.9 This decision left federal courts in a tangle with some,
like the Eleventh Circuit in Trichell, interpreting this decision as
narrowing the scope of standing for consumer protection causes of
action and others maintaining a broader interpretation, leaving
room for plaintiffs to obtain redress for statutory violations,
including under the FDCPA.10
In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue of Article
III standing in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez.11 There, the Court
8 Id. at 1005 (“Because [the plaintiffs] lack Article III standing, we vacate the district
courts’ judgments and remand the cases with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III
standing.”).
9 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016).
10 Compare Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., 926 F.3d 329, 339 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding
that a plaintiff debtor’s class action against her creditor’s alleged debt collector for
procedural violations of the FDCPA failed to satisfy the concreteness requirement for an
injury in fact necessary for Article III standing), and Frank v. Autovest, LLC, 961 F.3d
1185, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that in bringing a putative class action against a debt
purchaser and its collection agency for violations of the FDCPA, the plaintiff “did not suffer
a concrete injury-in-fact traceable to the alleged statutory violations” and therefore lacked
Article III standing), and Trichell, 964 F.3d at 1005 (holding that plaintiffs did not have
Article III standing because neither plaintiff suffered an injury in fact by receiving
misleading debt collection letters and because neither plaintiff was misled by the letters),
with Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., 897 F.3d 75, 78–80, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
that a mortgagor’s putative class action against his mortgage-loan servicer and its law
firm, alleging violations of FDCPA, sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to create Article
III standing), and Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding
that the plaintiffs “satisfied the concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact requirement of
Article III standing by alleging that [the defendant debt collection agency’s] purported
FDCPA violations created a material risk of harm to the interests recognized by Congress
in enacting the FDCPA”), abrogated by Ward v. Nat’l Patient Acct. Servs. Sols., Inc., 9 F.4th
357 (6th Cir. 2021). But see Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 994 F.3d
1341, 1344 (11th Cir.) (diverging from the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Trichell and
concluding that the plaintiff had Article III standing in alleging that the defendant debt
collector violated the FDCPA when it transmitted the plaintiff’s personal information to a
third-party vendor), rev’d, 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted and
opinion vacated, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
11 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
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held that if a plaintiff does not suffer a real harm and a risk of
future harm does not materialize, then there is no concrete harm
and therefore no standing to assert a claim for damages.12 As will
be discussed in this Note, TransUnion further shifted the circuit
split, causing more inconsistencies among the courts and yet again
making it harder for plaintiffs to assert consumer financial
protection claims in federal courts.13
The absence of a consistent standing doctrine among the circuit
courts’ jurisprudence is an area of great concern in the consumer
financial protection context because some doctrines deprive
consumers of a forum to enforce their interests. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) purports to enforce federal consumer
protection laws in an effort to “prevent fraud, deception, and
unfair business practices,” and the FTC’s ultimate mission is to
“protect consumers and promote competition.”14 While agency
enforcement of federal consumer financial protection laws is
important for protecting consumers as a whole, it is imperative
that courts recognize the shortcomings of government agencies,
including their underfunding and underenforcement of these
statutes.15 Although the FTC plays a crucial role in the
enforcement of many federal consumer financial protection
statutes, agency enforcement is simply not sufficient, resulting in
a need for private rights of action when consumers seek relief for

12 See id. at 2211 (“[T]here is a significant difference between (i) an actual harm that has
occurred but is not readily quantifiable, as in cases of libel and slander per se, and (ii) a
mere risk of future harm. By citing libel and slander per se, Spokeo did not hold that the
mere risk of future harm, without more, suffices to demonstrate Article III standing in a
suit for damages.”).
13 See infra Part V.
14 Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement (last visited Sept.
19, 2021).
15 See Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer
Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 663, 664 (2008) (“Recognizing the resource limitations of government agencies,
many consumer laws provide a private right of action so individual consumers also can
litigate violations of these laws.”); see also Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local
Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903,
1905 (2013) (opining that “due to insufficient funding and staffing, industry capture, or
some combination of both, these potentially powerful bodies of consumer protection law are
woefully under-enforced” (footnotes omitted)).
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violations of these statutes.16 Despite the existence of private
rights of action for violations of consumer financial protection
statutes, courts have failed to consistently permit plaintiffs to
seek redress due to a fundamental disagreement among the
circuit courts regarding the requirements for Article III
standing.17 This leaves consumers in jurisdictions that narrowly
construe Spokeo and TransUnion without any means to hold
companies accountable for harming, or attempting to harm,
American consumers.18 Therefore, courts’ interpretations of
Spokeo, TransUnion, and Article III standing doctrines have
serious implications for consumer financial protection.
This Note argues that TransUnion was wrongly decided and
that courts should instead apply the Spokeo standard on Article
III standing to federal consumer financial protection causes of
action for statutory violations less strictly and more consistently
than courts did prior to TransUnion. Part II first discusses the
background of the Article III standing doctrine, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife’s three-part structure as a constitutional
minimum for standing,19 and Spokeo’s concrete injury
requirement. Part II then examines several key federal consumer
financial protection statutes that are grossly diminished by
narrow, inconsistent interpretations of Spokeo. Part III next
explores the pre-TransUnion circuit split deepened by Trichell v.
Midland Credit Management, Inc., in which the Eleventh Circuit
joined the Seventh and D.C. Circuits in holding that the general
increased risk to consumers that may come from misleading debt
collection letters is not enough to confer standing under the
FDCPA for debtors who cannot show that they were personally
injured.20 Part IV discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
16 See Morris, supra note 15, at 1904–06 (discussing statutory causes of action available
to consumers under various consumer protection statutes enforced by the FTC).
17 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
18 See Morris, supra note 15, at 1906 (noting the “enormous gaps in consumer protection
enforcement”); see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2224 (2021) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“Although statutory damages are not necessarily a proxy for unjust
enrichment, they have a similar flavor in this case. . . . [T]hanks to this Court, [TransUnion]
may well be in a position to keep much of its ill-gotten gains.”).
19 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
20 See Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 964 F.3d 990, 1002 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding
“the approach of the Seventh and D.C. Circuits” to be “more faithful to Article III”). But see
Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 994 F.3d 1341, 1344, 1348 (11th
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TransUnion, in which the Court made clear: “No concrete harm,
no standing.”21 Part V next examines how the circuits reacted to
TransUnion and how the circuit split has changed. Part VI then
identifies the problem with some of the courts’ “no harm, no foul”
interpretations of the standing doctrine and criticizes the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion. Finally, Part VI
discusses the legislature’s role in establishing a concrete harm in
federal consumer financial protection statutes and offers a
proposal for increasing deference to Congress.

II. BACKGROUND
A. ARTICLE III STANDING FOLLOWING LUJAN AND SPOKEO

Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution lays the
groundwork for today’s standing doctrine.22 Namely, the “case and
controversy requirement” limits judicial power to “Cases” and
“Controversies.”23
Although
this
framework
seems
straightforward at first glance, the development of the modern
standing doctrine has proven otherwise. The issues and
requirements surrounding standing were not up for debate up
until the end of the twentieth century, and it was not until 1970
that a larger number of cases addressing the issue emerged.24 In
1992, Justice Antonin Scalia’s landmark opinion in Lujan v.

Cir.) (deviating from Trichell because the Section 1692e claim asserted in Trichell lacked
a close relationship to the common law tort of fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation
and because conferring standing in this case on a Section 1692c(b) claim supported the
congressional intent behind the FDCPA to prevent invasions of privacy), rev’d, 17 F.4th
1016 (11th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir.
2021).
21 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021).
22 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
23 Id. cl. 1.
24 See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992) (“In the history of the Supreme Court, standing
has been discussed in terms of Article III on 117 occasions . . . . Of those 117, 109, or nearly
all, of the discussions occurred since 1965 . . . . Not until the Data Processing case in 1970
did a large number of cases emerge on the issue of standing.” (citing Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970))).
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Defenders of Wildlife25 established a substantial portion of the
foundation for the modern standing doctrine.
1. Lujan’s Three-Part Structure. Justice Scalia’s opinion in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court case,
“significantly shift[ed] the law of standing.”26 In that case, the
plaintiffs, consisting of organizations dedicated to wildlife
conservation and other environmental causes, challenged a rule
interpreting the Endangered Species Act (ESA), a statute
designed to protect animals from man-made threats.27 The rule
rendered the ESA applicable only to actions within a U.S. territory
or on the high seas but not to actions taken in foreign nations.28
The preliminary issue in that case—pertinent to the focus of this
Note—was whether the plaintiffs had standing to seek judicial
review of the rule.29 In deciding this issue, the Lujan Court
established a three-part framework for standing, requiring that a
plaintiff first prove that he or she suffered an injury in fact, which
the Court defined as “an invasion of a legally-protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or
imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”30 Second, a
plaintiff must show “a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party
not before the court.’”31 Finally, “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to
merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a
favorable decision.’”32
The plaintiffs alleged that they had standing under a provision
of the ESA that allows “any person” to sue “to enjoin any person,
including the United States,” from violating the ESA.33
Specifically, plaintiffs argued that their “claim to injury [was] that
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
Sunstein, supra note 24, at 164–65.
27 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557–59.
28 Id. at 557–58.
29 Id. at 558.
30 Id. at 560 (citations omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155
(1990)).
31 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41–42 (1976)).
32 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
33 Id. at 571–72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).
25
26
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the lack of consultation with respect to certain funded activities
abroad ‘increas[ed] the rate of extinction of endangered and
threatened species.’”34 The Court reasoned that although this was
a “cognizable interest for purpose of standing[,] . . . ‘[t]he “injury
in fact” test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest.
It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the
injured.’”35 In holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish
standing for purposes of Article III, the Court declared that
a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance
about government—claiming only harm to his and
every citizen’s interest in proper application of the
Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
public at large—does not state an Article III case or
controversy.36
This holding sets the stage for today’s modern standing doctrine
and its seemingly confusing implications for plaintiffs seeking to
invoke statutory provisions with private causes of action.
2. Spokeo’s Concrete Injury Requirement. Lujan’s framework
for alleging an “injury in fact” is central to today’s standing
doctrine. The case of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins expanded upon this
holding, creating further barriers for consumer plaintiffs seeking
redress for statutory violations and laying the groundwork for
major circuit splits in the consumer financial protection context.37
In Spokeo, the central issue was whether respondent Robins had
standing under the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) to
sue petitioner Spokeo, Inc. in federal court.38 Spokeo operated a
“people search engine,” in which individuals could search people’s
names, phone numbers, or e-mail addresses, and Spokeo would

Id. at 562.
Id. at 562–63 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972)).
36 Id. at 573–74.
37 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (noting that because the Ninth
Circuit in its decision below did not “fully appreciate the distinction between concreteness
and particularization, its standing analysis was incomplete,” thus demonstrating that the
injury in fact inquiry requires more analysis than lower courts initially thought); supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
38 Id. at 1544 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681h).
34
35
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conduct a search to provide relevant information in response.39 A
search was performed on Robins, and some of the gathered and
disseminated information was inaccurate, leading Robins to file a
complaint on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated
individuals.40 Robins’s complaint alleged “that Spokeo willfully
failed to comply with the FCRA requirements” by generating a
profile on Robins with inaccurate information.41 The FCRA
requires that consumer reporting agencies, among other things,
“follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy of” consumer reports, to notify
providers and users of consumer information of their
responsibilities under the [FCRA], to limit the
circumstances in which such agencies provide
consumer reports “for employment purposes,” and to
post toll-free numbers for consumers to request
reports.42
Importantly, the statute further provides that “‘[a]ny person who
willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the Act] with
respect to any [individual] is liable to that [individual]’ for, among
other things, either ‘actual damages’ or statutory damages[,] . . .
costs of the action and attorney’s fees, and possibly punitive
damages.”43
Relying heavily on Lujan in its decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Robins did not satisfy the requirements of Article
III to establish sufficient standing because he alleged “a bare
procedural violation.”44 In reaching its holding, the Court first
discussed the three essential elements of standing, as established
in Lujan.45 The Court placed special emphasis on the first

Id.
Id.
41 Id. at 1546.
42 Id. at 1545 (citations omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681e(d), 1681b(b)(1),
1681j(a)).
43 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)).
44 Id. at 1550.
45 Id. at 1547.
39
40
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element, which requires the plaintiff to assert an injury in fact.46
The Court reiterated its language in Lujan, stating that “a
plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally
protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual
and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”47 Focusing on the
concrete and particularization requirements, the Court stressed
the need for an injury to be both concrete and particularized.48
With regards to particularization, the Court clarified that an
injury “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,”
and with regards to concreteness, the Court explained that the
injury must be “‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”49
Notably, however, the Court opined that to be concrete, an
injury need not necessarily be tangible—intangible injuries can
indeed be concrete.50 In discussing whether an intangible injury is
sufficiently concrete, the Court explained that “because Congress
is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum
Article III requirements, its judgment is also instructive and
important. . . . Congress may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate in law.’”51 Nevertheless, the Court made clear that
Congress’s role here does not conclusively mean that a plaintiff
satisfies the injury in fact requirement any time a statute
authorizes a person to vindicate a right embedded in that statute;
a concrete injury is still a prerequisite “even in the context of a
statutory violation.”52 The Court also went on to note that the risk
of real harm can satisfy the concreteness requirement in certain

46 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (“This case primarily concerns injury in fact, the ‘[f]irst
and foremost’ of standing’s three elements.” (alteration in original) (quoting Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998))).
47 Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
48 See id. (“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it is not
sufficient. An injury in fact must also be ‘concrete.’”).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1549 (noting that both history and Congress’s judgment play important roles in
the determination of whether an intangible harm is sufficient to constitute an injury in
fact).
51 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578).
52 See id. (“For that reason, Robins could not, for example, allege a bare procedural
violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of
Article III.”).
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situations.53 Still, the Court concluded that Robins did not satisfy
the requirements for Article III standing in his assertion of a “bare
procedural violation” because the Court found no harm or material
risk of harm in the procedural violations of the FCRA’s
requirements at issue.54
Although the Court in Spokeo cleared up some
misunderstanding as to the requirements for Article III standing
after Lujan, it left many questions unanswered and arguably
created even more confusion for consumers alleging statutory
violations. On the one hand, Spokeo clarified that an injury must
be both concrete and particularized and that although an injury
need not be tangible for it to be sufficiently concrete, a bare
procedural violation is not enough for standing.55 On the other
hand, the Court expressed that Congress has a role in embedding
concreteness in statutes.56 Yet the Court did not explain when, or
if, courts should defer to Congress’s judgment as to whether a
statutory provision makes an injury concrete. Finally, the Court
left open the question of when a risk of a material harm would be
adequate to satisfy the concreteness prong. This question is
central to many violations of consumer financial protection
statutes, and as will be discussed in more detail in Part IV, the
Court in TransUnion answered “no” to this question, leaving
plaintiffs without standing when they are unable to assert a
concrete, materialized harm.57
B. FINANCIAL CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES: AN OVERVIEW

Class actions filed under so called “no-harm” statutory
provisions make up a significant number of cases invoking
consumer protection statutes. Indeed, empirical findings have
shown that approximately half of all filings under federal
consumer protection statutes consist of class actions filed under

53 See id. (“In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified.”).
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 See id. (stating that Congress has the power to confer Article III standing on intangible
injuries that otherwise would not be considered concrete).
57 See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2213 (2021) (“[T]he risk of future
harm on its own does not support Article III standing for the plaintiffs’ damages claim.”).
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no-harm provisions.58 Still, given Spokeo’s categorization of some
federal consumer protection causes of action as “bare procedural
violations” with no harm or risk of harm present, some courts have
been wary of allowing claims for these statutory violations to
proceed.59 This Section presents an overview of some key federal
consumer financial protection statutes and the effects that Spokeo
and TransUnion are likely to have on consumers alleging
procedural violations under these statutes.
1. Fair Credit Reporting Act. Congress promulgated the FCRA
in response to the “need to insure that consumer reporting
agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness,
impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.”60
The statute applies to any entity that “regularly engages . . . in
the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties,” in addition to
employers using credit reports in their hiring efforts.61 Under the
FCRA, companies who willfully fail to comply are liable for
damages “not less than $100 and not more than $1,000,” whereas
the only remedy for negligent noncompliance is actual damages.62
The FCRA was the statute at the center of controversy in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which left many questions unanswered for
plaintiffs seeking to assert claims under the FCRA without a
showing of personal harm other than the presence of a statutory
violation.63 What exactly constitutes a concrete injury under the
FCRA remains unclear, although the Court’s decision in
TransUnion certainly provides more clarification than its decision

58 See Jason Scott Johnston, High Cost, Little Compensation, No Harm to Deter: New
Evidence on Class Actions Under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes, 2017 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 9 (discussing the results of a study of class actions filed under four federal
consumer protection statutes and analyzing the implications of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins).
59 See, e.g., Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 1002 (11th Cir. 2020)
(holding that the plaintiffs did not allege an injury in fact with allegations based on a
procedural violation that did not cause them harm or present a real risk of harm).
60 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4).
61 Id. §§ 1681a(f), 1681b(b).
62 Id. §§ 1681n(a)(1)(A), 1681o(a)(1).
63 See Loren Flath, Note, No Harm, No Foul? How Companies Can Limit Their Liability
Under Federal Consumer Protection Statutes After Spokeo, 46 RUTGERS L. REC. 125, 131–
32 (2018) (discussing the FCRA and effects on consumer causes of action for statutory
violations in the wake of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins).
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in Spokeo did. For example, the Spokeo Court did not define the
parameters for when a plaintiff’s misreported information is
merely a procedural violation versus when it constitutes an injury
in fact. Spokeo itself presented one example of when a plaintiff’s
claim under the FCRA is not enough to confer Article III standing,
but that determination still left other plaintiffs with little
guidance for assessing their potential claims.64
TransUnion also involved claims under the FCRA, and the
Court found that the 1,853 class members whose credit reports—
which included misleading Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) alerts and were disseminated to third-party businesses—
had suffered a concrete injury, while those plaintiffs whose credit
reports were not actually disseminated could not allege a
sufficiently concrete injury.65 The Court agreed with the plaintiffs
that the injury suffered from dissemination of the credit reports
“bears a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as
providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—namely, the
reputational harm associated with the tort of defamation.”66
After Spokeo, credit reporting agencies and employers using
credit checks in their hiring efforts were still subject to
considerable liability for violations of the FCRA, but it remains to
be seen whether TransUnion will impact this trend.67
2. Truth in Lending Act. Another significant federal consumer
financial protection statute is the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),
which aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so
that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair
credit billing and credit card practices.”68 This statute provides a
private cause of action—allowing for statutory damages to
affected consumers—and offers an opportunity for creditors to

64 See id. at 150 (stating that, as a result of Spokeo, “litigants are left to deal with the
uncertainty of whether a violation of a consumer protection statute leads to a ‘legally
protected interest’ on their own”).
65 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2208–09 (2021).
66 Id. at 2208 (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).
67 See Flath, supra note 63, at 132 (“[F]ailure to abide by these statutes has led to
expansive liability for credit reporting agencies and employers who use credit checks as
part of their hiring process.” (footnotes omitted)).
68 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
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remedy any errors within sixty days to avoid liability.69 Cases
brought under the TILA have had divergent outcomes, with some
courts holding that a violation of the TILA is enough to confer
standing, and others finding a mere procedural violation with no
additional harm insufficient.70 This inconsistency again
demonstrates the serious implications for consumer financial
protection causes of action in the wake of Spokeo and TransUnion,
as courts remain divided in their interpretations of Article III
standing requirements.
3. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The FDCPA is the key
consumer financial protection statute that is invoked most
frequently in no-harm causes of action.71 This statute aims to
“eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to
insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive
debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and
to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against
debt collection abuses.”72 The FDCPA largely applies to
individuals or entities engaged in consumer debt collection or who
“regularly collect[] or attempt[] to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another.”73 If
violated, statutory damages are available under the FDCPA,
consisting of up to $1,000 or the actual damages sustained as a
result of the failure to comply.74 The statute also provides that in
the case of a class action lawsuit, recovery shall be limited to
$500,000, or one percent of the net worth of the debt collector.75
The statute further notes that “[a] debt collector may not be held
liable . . . if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of
Id. §§ 1640(a)–(b).
Compare Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 200 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that a
credit card holder sufficiently alleged that she was at risk of a concrete and particularized
harm, as required to satisfy the injury in fact requirement for standing, stemming from
her bank’s noncompliance with TILA requirements), with Kelen v. Nordstrom, Inc., 259 F.
Supp. 3d 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint was not sufficient to
establish standing because although the plaintiff had a right to receive disclosures, she
must demonstrate that the retailer’s “actions (or inactions) injured her in a way distinct
from the body politic”).
71 See Flath, supra note 63, at 133 (noting that the FDCPA is used most commonly in
“no-harm” causes of action).
72 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
73 Id. § 1692a(6).
74 Id. § 1692k(a).
75 Id.
69
70

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol56/iss2/7

16

de Groot: No [Concrete] Harm, No Foul?

2022]

NO [CONCRETE] HARM, NO FOUL?

835

evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from
a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.”76
Evidently, several significant provisions embedded into the
FDCPA actively protect debt collectors and increase barriers to
redress for victims of unlawful debt collection practices. Still,
Spokeo, and subsequently TransUnion, raised that barrier even
further. Due to the ambiguity created by the Court’s decision in
Spokeo regarding standing, some courts have found a lack of
standing when plaintiffs assert procedural violations under the
FDCPA.77 Although the Court in TransUnion attempted to clarify
the standing doctrine, the circuit courts still lack a consistent
approach for determining whether an alleged injury is adequate
for an FDCPA claim.78 Further, the Court’s narrow decision in
TransUnion, along with the existing circuit split, generates
substantial implications for consumers seeking to invoke federal
consumer financial protections.

III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT PRIOR TO TRANSUNION
This Part explores a major circuit split regarding standing
under the FDCPA following Spokeo. Two circuit courts held that
plaintiff consumers sufficiently established standing for their
claims under the FDCPA, whereas three circuits found that
plaintiffs’ claims were not sufficient to establish an injury in fact,
as is required for Article III standing.
A. CIRCUITS FINDING A CONCRETE INJURY IN FACT

1. The Sixth Circuit. In Macy v. GC Services Ltd. Partnership,
consumer debtors brought a class action suit against a debt
collection agency, alleging FDCPA violations for sending letters
that did not accurately convey consumers’ rights under the
statute.79 Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that the debt
collection letters were deficient because they did not inform the
Id. § 1692k(c).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V.
79 897 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir. 2018), abrogated by Ward v. Nat’l Patient Acct. Servs. Sols.,
Inc., 9 F.4th 357 (6th Cir. 2021).
76
77
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plaintiffs that the debt collection agency was obligated to provide
additional debt and creditor information only if the plaintiffs
disputed their debts in writing, thus creating a risk that the
plaintiffs could waive protections afforded to them by the
FDCPA.80 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
ultimately held that the plaintiffs’ complaint was sufficiently
concrete to establish Article III standing.81
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that “Spokeo did not mean to
disturb the Court’s prior opinions recognizing that a direct
violation of a specific statutory interest recognized by Congress,
standing alone, may constitute a concrete injury without the need
to allege any additional harm.”82 The court further explained that
the debt collection agency’s “letters present[ed] a risk of harm to
the FDCPA’s goal of ensuring that consumers are free from
deceptive debt-collection practices because the letters provide[d]
misleading information about the manner in which the consumer
can exercise the consumer’s statutory right[s].”83 Therefore, the
court concluded that this statutory violation was not merely a bare
procedural one and that the “[p]laintiffs ha[d] satisfied the
concreteness prong of the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III
standing by alleging that [the debt collection agency’s] purported
FDCPA violations created a material risk of harm to the interests
recognized by Congress in enacting the FDCPA.”84 As this Note
later explains, Macy has since been abrogated by Ward v. National
Patient Accountant Services Solutions, Inc., in which the Sixth
Circuit attributed its decision directly to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in TransUnion.85
2. The Second Circuit. In Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki &
Associates, P.C., a mortgager brought a class action lawsuit
against a mortgage-loan servicer and its law firm for violations of
the FDCPA, including incorrect identification of the servicer as
the creditor in a foreclosure complaint, certificate of merit, and
request for judicial intervention.86 In holding that the plaintiff

Id.
Id. at 761.
82 Id. at 754 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
83 Id. at 757.
84 Id. at 761.
85 Ward v. Nat’l Patient Acct. Servs. Sols., Inc., 9 F.4th 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2021).
86 897 F.3d 75, 78–80 (2d Cir. 2018).
80
81
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sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to create standing under
Article III, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reasoned that, if “[t]aken as true, this misrepresentation might
have deprived [the plaintiff mortgager] of information relevant to
the debt prompting the foreclosure proceeding, posing a ‘risk of
real harm’ insofar as it could hinder the exercise of his right to
defend or otherwise litigate that action.”87 The court explained
that the purpose of the FDCPA is “to protect against the abusive
debt collection practices likely to disrupt a debtor’s life”88 and that
provisions of the FDCPA further this purpose by protecting
consumers from “false, deceptive, or misleading” debt collection
practices89 and requiring debt collectors to provide consumers
with “a detailed validation notice” to allow consumers to confirm
that they owe the debt and in what amount prior to making a
payment.90
B. CIRCUITS FAILING TO FIND A CONCRETE INJURY IN FACT

1. The Seventh Circuit. In Casillas v. Madison Avenue
Associates, Inc., a plaintiff debtor brought a class action suit
against her creditor’s debt collector under the FDCPA, alleging
that the debt collection letter that she received failed to specify
that she was required to communicate with the agency in writing
to trigger the statutory protections.91 The FDCPA provision that
the plaintiff invoked requires debt collectors to notify consumers
about the process for verifying debt under the statute, and part of
this process is requiring that the debtor communicate in writing,
rather than through an oral communication.92 In holding that the
plaintiff did not have standing for purposes of Article III, the court
Id. at 81–82 (citing Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016)).
Id. at 81 (quoting Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010)).
89 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e).
90 Id. (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996)).
91 926 F.3d 329, 331 (7th Cir. 2019).
92 See id. at 332. The court noted that the FDCPA “requires a debt collector to give a
written notice to a consumer within five days of its initial communication” and “[t]hat
notice must include . . . a description of two mechanisms that a debtor can use to verify her
debt. First, a consumer can notify the debt collector ‘in writing’ that she disputes all or part
of the debt . . . .” Id. And “[s]econd, a consumer can make a ‘written request’ that the debt
collector provide her with the name and address of the original creditor . . . .” Id. (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1692g(a)).
87
88
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reasoned that she failed to allege that the debt collector’s actions
“harmed or posed any real risk of harm to her interests under the
[FDCPA].”93 The court found that the plaintiff neither “lost [nor]
risked losing the” FDCPA’s “statutory protections” because “she
did not allege that she tried to dispute or verify her debt orally.”94
Therefore, the court held that this was merely a “bare procedural
violation” insufficient to confer standing.95
2. The District of Columbia Circuit. In Frank v. Autovest, LLC,
the plaintiff consumer brought a class action suit against her debt
purchaser and its collection agency for violations of the FDCPA.96
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had violated
the statute by filing affidavits that contained “false, deceptive, or
misleading representation[s]” in their attempts to collect
contractually unauthorized contingency fees.97 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the plaintiff
lacked Article III standing.98 The court reasoned that the plaintiff
failed to identify a concrete injury that could be traced back to the
false representations within the affidavits or the request for
contingency fees because the plaintiff did not take any action in
reliance on those statements.99 The court explained that “[a]fter
Spokeo, a plaintiff must demonstrate a subjective—that is, an
actual—personal injury for standing even when his merits
argument turns on the perspective of an objective, unsophisticated
consumer.”100
3. The Eleventh Circuit, with a Caveat. Finally, in 2020 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Trichell v.
Midland Credit Management, Inc., in which consumer plaintiffs
brought separate actions against a debt collector, all alleging that
the debt collection letters they received were misleading and
therefore in violation of the FDCPA.101 In that case, the two
plaintiffs received debt collection letters that they alleged were
Id. at 334.
Id.
95 Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
96 961 F.3d 1185, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
97 Id. at 1187 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e).
98 Id. at 1188.
99 Id. (explaining that the plaintiff was not harmed or misled in any way during the
collection action by the affidavits).
100 Id. at 1190.
101 964 F.3d 990, 994 (11th Cir. 2020).
93
94
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misleading because the letters presented seemingly generous
repayment plans for debt that was actually time-barred under
state law.102 The plaintiffs contended that the letters “created a
risk that unsophisticated consumers might be misled into
making . . . payments on time-barred debt.”103 The court, however,
rejected this argument and held that the plaintiffs lacked Article
III standing.104 In so holding, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs
failed to “allege that the collection letters posed any risk of harm
to themselves” and that any risk that may have been present had
dissipated before they filed their suit.105 The court emphasized
that statutory violations must pose a risk of concrete harm to the
individual plaintiff for a particularized injury to be recognized, a
risk that was lacking in this case.106 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that they suffered an
informational injury because the misleading information did not
cause the plaintiffs any adverse effects to satisfy Article III.107
Although the Eleventh Circuit’s strict interpretation of Article
III standing resulted in a denial of standing for the plaintiffs in
Trichell, the court came to a different conclusion in its more recent
decision in Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Management
Services, Inc.108 In Hunstein, the plaintiff incurred debt to a
hospital for his son’s medical treatment, and the hospital assigned
the debt to the defendant debt collector.109 The defendant
subsequently sent an electronic communication to a third-party
vendor for the vendor to send a collection letter to the plaintiff on
102 See id. at 995. The court noted that the bottom of each debt collection letter included
a disclaimer acknowledging that “[t]he law limits how long you can be sued on a debt and
how long a debt can appear on your credit report. Due to the age of this debt, we will not
sue you for it or report payment or non-payment of it to a credit bureau.” Id.
103 Id. at 1000.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 1002 (“[A] statutory violation that poses a risk of concrete harm to
consumers in general, but not to the individual plaintiff, cannot fairly be described as
causing a particularized injury to the plaintiff. Here, neither Trichell nor Cooper has
alleged such a particularized injury.”).
107 Id. at 1004 (“Absent any such concrete impact, [the plaintiffs] can complain only about
receiving information that had no impact on them. . . . [A]n asserted informational injury
that causes no adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III.” (emphasis omitted)).
108 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir.), rev’d, 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted
and vacated, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
109 Id. at 1345.
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the defendant’s behalf.110 In doing so, the defendant, without the
plaintiff’s authorization, transmitted debt-related personal
information about the plaintiff, and the plaintiff filed suit for a
violation of Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA.111 Specifically, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant debt collector communicated a
consumer’s personal information to a third party in connection
with a debt collection.112 The Eleventh Circuit held that a violation
of Section 1692c(b) of the FDCPA gives rise to an Article III
concrete injury in fact and that the defendant debt collector
sending the plaintiff’s personal information to its letter vendor
constituted a communication “in connection with the collection of
any debt” under Section 1692c(b).113 In so holding, the court found
that, although the plaintiff alleged neither a tangible harm114 nor
a risk of real harm,115 the statutory violation was sufficient to
constitute a concrete injury in fact to confer Article III standing.116
The court considered both “history and the judgment of Congress”
in concluding that the plaintiff’s claim bore a close relationship to
the common law invasion of privacy tort and that “Congress
identified the ‘invasion[] of individual privacy’ as one of the harms
against which the statute is directed.”117 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit found that history and Congress’s judgment were
sufficient to confer standing on the plaintiff to sue in this case.118

Id.
See id. (describing the information as “including, among other things: (1) his status
as a debtor, (2) the exact balance of his debt, (3) the entity to which he owed the debt, (4)
that the debt concerned his son’s medical treatment, and (5) his son’s name”).
112 Id. at 1344.
113 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)).
114 Id. at 1346 (finding that the plaintiff failed to allege a tangible harm because the
complaint alleges no physical injury, financial loss, or emotional distress and instead
contains conclusory and vague assertions of a negative impact).
115 Id. (stating that plaintiff did not allege a “risk of real harm” because he only alleged
that a debtor “may well be harmed by the spread” of such information and that vague
assertion is not sufficient to confer standing).
116 Id. at 1348–49 (finding that the plaintiff’s claim sufficiently resembled a common-law
tort and that “the FDCPA's statutory findings expressly address the very harm alleged—
an ‘invasion[ ] of individual privacy’” (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)).
117 Id. at 1347–48 (alternation in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)).
118 Id. at 1348–49 (“Because (1) § 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a harm that
American courts have long recognized as cognizable and (2) Congress’s judgment indicates
that violations of § 1692c(b) constitute a concrete injury, we conclude that Hunstein has
the requisite standing to sue.”).
110
111
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Although the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Hunstein seems to
diverge from its holding in Trichell, the court purported to
reconcile this potential discrepancy in its opinion.119 Specifically,
the court reasoned that the Section 1692e claim asserted in
Trichell lacked a sufficiently close relationship to the most
comparable common law tort of fraudulent or negligent
misrepresentation.120 Further, the Hunstein court emphasized the
congressional intent behind the FDCPA in preventing invasions
of privacy.121 By contrast, the court in Trichell opined that there
is no evidence of Congress intending to address “misleading
communication[s] that fail[] to mislead.”122 Thus, the Eleventh
Circuit’s holdings regarding concrete injuries and standing in
Trichell and Hunstein stem from the court’s focus on the claim’s
relationship to a historic common law tort, paired with the
congressional intent behind the statute at issue.
As will be discussed in Part V, after the U.S. Supreme Court
announced its decision in TransUnion, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit vacated its original opinion in Hunstein
and issued a new opinion,123 which the court again vacated and
thereafter ordered another rehearing en banc.124

IV. TRANSUNION LLC V. RAMIREZ
In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue of Article
III standing and narrowed its standing doctrine even further.125
In TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the lead plaintiff, Sergio Ramirez,
had visited a car dealership in 2011, hoping to buy a car.126 After

119 See id. at 1348 (clarifying that the Eleventh Circuit’s “decision in Trichell does not
require a contrary conclusion”).
120 Id. at 1348.
121 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)).
122 Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 999 (11th Cir. 2020).
123 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 17 F.4th 1016, 1020 (11th Cir.),
reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
124 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 17 F.4th 1103, 1104 (11th Cir.
2021).
125 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021); see also Article III Standing—
Separation of Powers—Class Actions—TransUnion v. Ramirez, 135 HARV. L. REV. 333, 333
(2021) (“TransUnion will likely make it more difficult for class action plaintiffs to have
their day in federal court.”).
126 TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2201.
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negotiating a price, the dealership ran a credit check on Ramirez
and his wife that revealed his name as a match to names on the
Department of the Treasury’s OFAC list of “terrorists, drug
traffickers, or other serious criminals.”127 Consequently, the car
dealership refused to sell Ramirez a car, and his wife had to
purchase the car in her name.128 A day later, Ramirez requested a
copy of his credit file from TransUnion.129 TransUnion sent
Ramirez his credit file along with a summary of his rights, but the
mailing did not mention the OFAC alert.130 The next day, Ramirez
received a second mailing from TransUnion that alerted him that
his name was a potential match to names on the OFAC list.131 Due
to his concern about the mailings, Ramirez consulted an attorney
and cancelled an upcoming trip that he had planned.132
TransUnion later removed the alert from Ramirez’s credit file.133
In February 2012, Ramirez filed suit against TransUnion,
alleging three violations of the FCRA.134 Ramirez alleged that
TransUnion: (1) “failed to follow reasonable procedures to ensure
the accuracy of information in his credit file”135; (2) “failed to
provide him with all the information in his credit file upon his
request”136; and (3) “violated its obligation to provide him with a
summary of his rights ‘with each written disclosure,’ because
TransUnion’s second mailing did not contain a summary of
Ramirez’s rights.”137
Ramirez sought to certify a class of individuals who received
mailings from TransUnion similar to the second mailing that
Ramirez had received.138 Over TransUnion’s opposition, the
district court certified the class of “8,185 members, including
Ramirez.”139 The parties stipulated that “only 1,853 members of

Id.
Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 2201–02.
132 Id. at 2202.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)).
136 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1)).
137 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2)).
138 Id.
139 Id.
127
128
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the class . . . had their credit reports disseminated” to third
parties.140 The district court held that all class members, including
those whose reports were not sent to third parties, had Article III
standing.141 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in
relevant part, holding that all class members “had Article III
standing to recover damages.”142
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case.143
Writing for the majority, Justice Kavanaugh144 first summarized
the requirements for Article III standing, with a focus on the
requirement that plaintiffs show a “concrete harm.”145 The Court
discussed standing’s basis in the idea of separation of powers146
and stated that “a federal court may resolve only ‘a real
controversy with real impact on real persons.’”147 Next, the Court
examined what makes a harm concrete for purposes of Article III
standing.148 The Court stated that generally history and tradition
should be considered, and the Court cited to its decision in Spokeo
v. Robins, in which it found that “courts should assess whether the
alleged injury to the plaintiff has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm
‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
American courts.”149 The Court pointed to “the most obvious”
harms being “traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms
and monetary harms.”150 The Court stated that “[v]arious
intangible harms can also be concrete,” some of which include

Id.
Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 2214.
144 Id. at 2199.
145 Id. at 2203.
146 See id. (“Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury
caused by the defendant and redressable by the court ensures that federal courts decide
only ‘the rights of individuals,’ and that federal courts exercise ‘their proper function in a
limited and separated government.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803); and then quoting John G. Roberts, Jr., Comment, Article III Limits
on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1224 (1993))).
147 Id. (quoting Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2103 (2019)).
148 See id. at 2204 (“The question in this case focuses on the Article III requirement that
the plaintiff ’s injury in fact be ‘concrete’—that is, ‘real, and not abstract.’”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016)).
149 Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).
150 Id.
140
141
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“reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and
intrusion upon seclusion.”151
The Court next noted that “[c]ourts must afford due respect to
Congress’s decision to impose a statutory prohibition or obligation
on a defendant, and to grant a plaintiff a cause of action to sue
over the defendant's violation of that statutory prohibition or
obligation.”152 Nevertheless, the Court stated that Congress “may
not simply enact an injury into existence, using its lawmaking
power to transform something that is not remotely harmful into
something that is.”153 The Court clarified that, even in the context
of a statutory violation, a plaintiff must still show a concrete
injury to have standing.154
Next, the Court examined whether the class members in this
action had standing to sue TransUnion under the FCRA.155
Regarding the first claim alleging that TransUnion failed to
“follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy” of the credit files, the Court held that the 1,853 class
members whose credit reports were sent to third parties had
standing because their injuries bore a close relationship to the
reputational harm associated with the tort of defamation.156 As for
the remaining 6,332 class members, the Court held that those
plaintiffs lacked standing because their credit information was
not disseminated to any potential creditors, and therefore, they
lacked the analogous element of publication required for a
traditional defamation claim.157

Id.
Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1549).
153 Id. at 2205 (quoting Hagy v. Demers & Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2018)).
154 See id. (“Only those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant’s
statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in federal court.”).
155 Id. at 2207.
156 See id. at 2208–09 (“TransUnion provided third parties with credit reports containing
OFAC alerts that labeled the class members as potential terrorists, drug traffickers, or
serious criminals. The 1,853 class members therefore suffered a harm with a ‘close
relationship’ to the harm associated with the tort of defamation.”).
157 See id. at 2209–10 (“In cases such as these where allegedly inaccurate or misleading
information sits in a company database, the plaintiffs’ harm is roughly the same, legally
speaking, as if someone wrote a defamatory letter and then stored it in her desk drawer. A
letter that is not sent does not harm anyone, no matter how insulting the letter is. So too
here.”).
151
152
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The Court then assessed the plaintiffs’ argument that a risk of
future harm should give rise to standing.158 The Court rejected
this argument, finding that to have standing for their damages
claim, plaintiffs would need to “demonstrate that the risk of future
harm materialized”159 or that “the class members were
independently harmed by their exposure to the risk itself.”160 The
Court found that the 6,332 plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate
both possibilities.161
The Court then rejected the plaintiffs’ two other claims under
the FCRA—the disclosure claim and the summary-of-rights
claim—because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a close
relationship between TransUnion’s formatting error underlying
these claims162 and a harm “traditionally recognized as providing
a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”163 The Court further
dismissed an argument put forth by the United States as amicus
curiae that the class members suffered a concrete “informational
injury” because rather than arguing that they did not receive
required information, the plaintiffs argued merely that they
received the information in the wrong format.164 Thus, the Court
concluded, “[n]o concrete harm, no standing.”165
Justice Thomas dissented.166 He began by discussing the
history of standing and focused on the distinction between a
plaintiff suing for a violation of private rights and a plaintiff suing

See id. at 2210 (“[The Plaintiffs] say that the 6,332 class members suffered a concrete
injury for Article III purposes because the existence of misleading OFAC alerts in their
internal credit files exposed them to a material risk that the information would be
disseminated in the future to third parties and thereby cause them harm.”).
159 See id. at 2211 (noting that to demonstrate that the risk of future harm materialized
the plaintiffs would need to show “that the inaccurate OFAC alerts in their internal
TransUnion credit files were ever provided to third parties or caused a denial of credit”).
160 See id. (stating that to show “that the class members were independently harmed by
their exposure to the risk itself,” they would have to show “that they suffered some other
injury (such as an emotional injury) from the mere risk that their credit reports would be
provided to third-party businesses”).
161 Id.
162 See id. at 2213 (“In support of standing, the plaintiffs thus contend that the
TransUnion mailings were formatted incorrectly and deprived them of their right to receive
information in the format required by statute.”).
163 Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
164 Id. at 2214.
165 Id.
166 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158
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for a violation of a duty owed to the whole community.167 While
suits for violations of a plaintiff’s private rights required only that
the plaintiff allege a violation, suits based on violations of duties
owed to the whole community required that the plaintiff show
both a legal injury and damage.168 Justice Thomas then pointed
out that, “[w]hile the Court today discusses the supposed failure
to show ‘injury in fact,’ courts for centuries held that injury in law
to a private right was enough to create a case or controversy.”169
Here, Justice Thomas contended that the statutory provisions of
the FCRA create certain duties owed to consumers, that those
duties are particularized to individuals (the subject of the credit
report or the consumer requesting the information), and that the
jury found that TransUnion violated each class member’s
individual rights.170 Justice Thomas argued that this combination
leads to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have a concrete injury
for standing to sue.171
Justice Thomas noted that “injury in fact served as an
additional way to get into federal court,” and “Article III injury
still could ‘exist solely by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights,
the invasion of which creates standing.”’”172 He pointed to the
Court’s decision in Spokeo, which “made clear that ‘Congress is
well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum
Article III requirements’ and explained that ‘the violation of a
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some
circumstances to constitute injury in fact.’”173 Justice Thomas
criticized the majority for taking Congress’s role and usurping “its
167 See id. at 2217 (“At the time of the founding, whether a court possessed judicial power
over an action with no showing of actual damages depended on whether the plaintiff sought
to enforce a right held privately by an individual or a duty wed broadly to the community.”
(citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1351–52 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
168 See id. (noting that “[t]his distinction mattered not only for traditional common-law
rights, but also for newly created statutory ones”).
169 Id. at 2218 (“And this understanding accords proper respect for the power of Congress
and other legislatures to define legal rights.”).
170 See id. at 2218–19 (“Were there any doubt that consumer reporting agencies owe
these duties to specific individuals—and not to the larger community—Congress created a
cause of action providing that ‘[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply’ with an FCRA
requirement ‘with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting 15. U.S.C. § 1681n(a))).
171 Id. at 2219.
172 Id. (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
173 Id. at 2220 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543–44 (2016)).
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power to create and define rights,” instead placing it in the hands
of the courts contrary to the principle of separation of powers.174
To Justice Thomas, “[w]eighing the harms caused by specific facts
and choosing remedies seems . . . like a much better fit for
legislatures and juries than for this Court.”175 Last, Justice
Thomas noted that the majority’s decision in this case will likely
result in TransUnion financially profiting off the consumers
whose rights it violated.176
Justice Kagan also dissented.177 She took issue with the
majority for evading the separation of powers doctrine in which
the Article IIII case-or-controversy requirement is rooted, by
holding “for the first time, that a specific class of plaintiffs whom
Congress allowed to bring a lawsuit cannot do so under Article
III.”178 Justice Kagan agreed with Justice Thomas that “Congress
has broad ‘power to create and define rights,’” and stated that
Congress has the power to protect those rights by allowing
plaintiffs to sue for both past harms and a material risk of future
harms.179
Justice Kagan further argued that it was not “so speculative
that a company in the business of selling credit reports to third
parties [would] in fact sell a credit report to a third party.”180 She
concluded that “Congress is better suited than courts” to assess
risks and harms, and courts should only override Congress’s
authorization to sue “when Congress could not reasonably have
thought that a suit will contribute to compensating or preventing
the harm at issue.”181

174 See id. at 2221 (“According to the majority, courts alone have the power to sift and
weigh harms to decide whether they merit the Federal Judiciary's attention. In the name
of protecting the separation of powers, this Court has relieved the legislature of its power
to create and define rights.” (citation omitted)).
175 Id. at 2224.
176 See id. (“Although statutory damages are not necessarily a proxy for unjust
enrichment, they have a similar flavor in this case. . . . [T]hanks to this Court, [TransUnion]
may well be in a position to keep much of its ill-gotten gains.”).
177 Id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
178 See id. (“The Court here transforms standing law from a doctrine of judicial modesty
into a tool of judicial aggrandizement.”).
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 2226.
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V. THE CIRCUITS’ REACTIONS TO TRANSUNION
As a result of TransUnion’s attempt to clarify Article III
standing doctrine, some circuit courts have altered their stances
on the issue in the FDCPA context. While the Second Circuit,182
the Seventh Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit maintain their preTransUnion stances on the Article III standing requirements for
plaintiffs alleging FDCPA violations, the Sixth Circuit has shifted
its approach significantly,183 and the Eleventh Circuit reiterated
its position after TransUnion.184 This Part explores the ways in
which some circuits have shifted or clarified their understandings
of Article III standing in the FDCPA context after the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in TransUnion.
A. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit shifted its
position on Article III standing after the U.S. Supreme Court
decided TransUnion. Shortly after TransUnion, the Sixth Circuit
decided Ward v. National Patient Account Services Solutions, Inc.,
in which the court concluded that TransUnion abrogated Macy, a
case in which the court found standing.185 In Ward, the plaintiff
182 Although Cohen has not been abrogated and the Second Circuit has not yet changed
its position on standing in the context of the FDCPA, the court seems to have switched
course outside of the FDCPA’s scope after TransUnion. In Maddox v. Bank of New York
Mellon Trust Co., the Second Circuit vacated its prior decision in the case and held that
the plaintiffs’ allegations “fail to support Article III standing, and that they may not pursue
their claims for the statutory penalties imposed by the New York Legislature in federal
court.” 19 F.4th 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2021). The court relied heavily on TransUnion in finding
that the plaintiffs did not suffer a concrete harm as a result of the defendant bank’s alleged
violation of New York’s mortgage-satisfaction-recording statutes. Id. at 62–63 (“‘No
concrete harm; no standing.’ This equation, which opens the Supreme Court’s TransUnion
decision, leaves little room for interpretation and may be sufficient to resolve the issue
before us.” (citation omitted) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200
(2021))). The court made no mention of Cohen in its decision, and Cohen remains good law
as of this writing. Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., 897 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2018).
183 Ward v. Nat’l Patient Acct. Servs. Sols., Inc., 9 F.4th 357 (6th Cir. 2021).
184 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir.),
reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
185 Ward, 9 F.4th at 361; see Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 2018),
abrogated by Ward, 9 F.4th 357 (holding that plaintiffs had standing in a class action
against a debt collector who sent letters to debtor-plaintiffs that violated the FDCPA for
containing “legally deficient warnigns and advisories”).
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received treatment at a medical center on two separate occasions,
owing a balance after each visit.186 The medical center hired the
defendant debt servicer to collect debts from its patients, including
the plaintiff.187 The debt servicer sent several billing statements
to the plaintiff, all of which included the necessary account
number, dates of treatment, payment due date, and instructions
for payment.188 The statements further identified the defendant
as a debt servicer.189 In addition to the billing statements, the debt
servicer also called the plaintiff and left voice messages on two
occasions, one for each billing statement.190 The voice messages
did not explain that the defendant was a debt servicer, and they
referred to the defendant as “NPAS” rather than “NPAS, Inc.”191
The debt servicer followed a similar process with regards to the
plaintiff’s second account for the second hospital visit.192 After
retaining counsel, the plaintiff sent a cease-and-desist letter to a
different entity with a similar name as the defendant, allegedly
resulting from confusion regarding the entity’s name in the voice
messages.193 The debt servicer sent another statement and left a
final voice message a few months later.194
Over two months after the plaintiff received the last phone call,
he filed suit against the debt servicer, alleging three violations of
the FDCPA, all of which were based on the debt servicer’s voice
messages.195 The plaintiff alleged that the debt servicer violated
the FDCPA by failing to: (1) “identify itself as a debt collector,”196
(2) “identify the ‘true name’ of its business,”197 and (3) “disclose its
corporate designation.”198 The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendant debt servicer because it did not qualify

Ward, 9 F.4th at 359.
Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 359–60.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 360.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)).
197 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(14)).
198 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6)).
186
187
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as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA.199 The plaintiff
appealed.200
The Sixth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary
judgment order and remanded the case with instructions to
dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.201 The court
focused primarily on whether the plaintiff suffered a concrete
injury, as is required under Article III.202 Before diving into its
analysis, the court noted that TransUnion abrogated the court’s
holding in Macy that “plaintiffs satisfied the concreteness
requirement where ‘FDCPA violations created a material risk of
harm to the interests recognized by Congress in enacting the
FDCPA.’”203 The court stated that, after TransUnion, “plaintiffs
must demonstrate that ‘the risk of future harm materialized,’ or
that the plaintiffs ‘were independently harmed by their exposure
to the risk itself.’”204
As to the plaintiff’s argument that the procedural violations
alone should give rise to standing, the court disagreed and found
that “the procedural injuries [the plaintiff] asserts do not bear a
close relationship to traditional harms.”205 The court found that
the failure to provide information does not resemble an invasion
of privacy, and the plaintiff’s first argument therefore failed.206
The court similarly rejected the plaintiff’s second argument that a
concrete injury flowed from the FDCPA violation.207 The court
found that “confusion alone is not a concrete injury for Article III
Id.
Id.
201 Id. at 363.
202 See id. at 361 (“Here, the parties’ arguments center on whether Ward has
demonstrated injury in fact. . . . Instead, this appeal centers on whether Ward suffered a
concrete injury.”).
203 Id. (quoting Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2018),
abrogated by Ward, 9 F.4th 357).
204 Id. at 361 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2211 (2021)); id.
(noting that the plaintiff “must show either that the procedural harm itself is a concrete
injury of the sort traditionally recognized or that the procedural violations caused an
independent concrete injury”).
205 Id. at 362.
206 See id. (“[T]he mere failure to provide certain information does not mirror an
intentional intrusion into the private affairs of another. Indeed, Ward alleged in his
complaint that NPAS, Inc.’s violation, i.e., the use of an abbreviated name, confused him,
not that it invaded his privacy.”).
207 Id. at 363.
199
200
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purposes,”208 the cost of hiring counsel cannot give rise to a
concrete harm,209 and finally, the plaintiff did not clearly allege a
harm suffered from the last voice message he received after
sending the cease-and-desist letter.210 Ultimately, the court
concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing because he “failed to
show more than a bare procedural violation of the FDCPA.”211
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
has not shifted its stance on the requirements for Article III
standing, it did clarify its position on standing in the FDCPA
context after TransUnion. As previously discussed, the Eleventh
Circuit held in Hunstein that an alleged violation of a procedural
right under the FDCPA constituted a concrete injury for purposes
of Article III standing.212 After TransUnion was decided, however,
the court reheard Hunstein en banc, vacated its original opinion,
and substituted it with a new one.213
On rehearing, the court again held that the alleged violation of
§ 1692c(b) of the FDCPA constituted a concrete injury in fact
under Article III and that the defendant debt collector sending the
plaintiff’s personal information to its “vendor constituted a
communication ‘in connection with the collection of any debt’
within the meaning of § 1692c(b).”214 As in its original opinion, the
court first noted that because the plaintiff’s injury is not tangible
and he is unable to demonstrate a “risk of real harm,” the plaintiff
would need to show standing “through an intangible injury

Id.
See id. (noting that “applying Ward’s logic to any plaintiff who hires counsel to
affirmatively pursue a claim would nullify the limits created under Article III”).
210 See id. (“Because Ward did not clearly assert in his complaint that he received—let
alone was harmed by—an additional phone call, we need not decide whether an unwanted
call might qualify as a concrete injury.”).
211 Id.
212 See discussion supra Section III.B.3.
213 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 17 F.4th 1016, 1020 (11th Cir.),
reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 17 F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court’s TransUnion decision “bears on one of the issues presented in the
case” (citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021))).
214 Id. at 1020 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b)).
208
209
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resulting from a statutory violation.”215 In assessing whether the
plaintiff demonstrated an intangible injury from the statutory
violation, the court considered both the history and judgment of
Congress, as Spokeo instructs courts to do.216
As to the history prong, the court stated that it “can discern a
concrete injury where—in the words of TransUnion, echoing
Spokeo—‘the asserted harm has a “close relationship” to a harm
traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
American courts.’”217 Under this framework, the court concluded
that the plaintiff “alleged a harm similar in kind to the commonlaw tort of public disclosure of private facts.”218 The court
explained that the plaintiff claimed that the defendant debt
collector “‘disclosed’ what he calls ‘sensitive medical
information’—including his minor son’s name and prior medical
treatment—to ‘the employees of an unauthorized third-party mail
house.’”219 The court found that, based on the plaintiff’s
allegations, “some measure of disclosure in fact occurred.”220 The
court further noted that although the disclosure in this case may
be “less widespread . . . than the disclosures typical of actionable
public-disclosure-of-private-facts claims,” that is simply “a matter
of ‘degree,’” and all that is pertinent here is that the
“dissemination of . . . personal information remain similar in
‘kind.’”221
As to the congressional judgment prong, the court found that it
also points to standing in this case.222 The court noted that
Congress’s judgment is reflected both in the text of § 1692c(b) of
215 Id. at 1022–23 (“‘[T]he violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be
sufficient in some circumstances to constitute an injury in fact,’ such that ‘a plaintiff . . .
need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’” (alterations
in original) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016))).
216 Id. at 1023 (“Spokeo instructs that in determining whether an alleged statutory
violation confers Article III standing, we should consider ‘[1] history and [2] the judgment
of Congress.’” (quoting Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. at 1549)).
217 Id. (quoting TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200).
218 Id. at 1027.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1027–28 (noting that TransUnion’s approach to Spokeo’s close-relationship test
requires “an intangible injury to be of the same kind as a harm actionable at common law
but not necessarily the same degree”).
222 Id. at 1032 (“[W]e conclude that ‘the judgment of Congress’ also favors [the
plaintiff].”).
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the FDCPA and in a section of the FDCPA titled “Congressional
findings and declaration of purpose,” where “Congress identified
the ‘invasion[] of individual privacy’ as one of the harms against
which the statute is directed.”223 Contrasting this case to Trichell,
the court found that “here—and unlike Trichell—the alleged harm
fits neatly within the ‘invasions of individual privacy’ that
Congress expressly addressed.”224 Thus, the court found that both
the history and judgment of Congress led to the conclusion that
the plaintiff had standing under Article III.225
After concluding that the plaintiff had standing to sue, the
court next turned to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim under the
FDCPA.226 The court ultimately found that the debt collector’s
communication to the mail vendor “at least ‘concerned,’ was ‘with
reference to,’ and bore a ‘relationship [or] association’ to its
collection of [the plaintiff’s] debt.”227 Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the plaintiff “alleged a communication ‘in
connection with the collection of any debt’ as that phrase is
commonly understood.”228
On November 17, 2021, the Eleventh Circuit once again sua
sponte vacated its opinion in Hunstein and ordered that the case
be reheard en banc.229

VI. ADDRESSING BARRIERS TO CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION IN THE COURTS
A. ASSESSING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Prior to TransUnion, the circuit split on standing regarding
violations of the FDCPA revealed significant discrepancies
surrounding the meaning of Spokeo, which had a substantial
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)).
Id. at 1033 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)).
225 Id. (“Because (1) § 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a harm that American courts
have long recognized as cognizable and (2) Congress’s judgment indicates that violations
of § 1692c(b) constitute a concrete injury, we conclude that Hunstein has the requisite
standing to sue.”).
226 Id.
227 Id. at 1034–35 (first alteration in original).
228 Id. at 1035.
229 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 17 F.4th 1103, 1104 (11th Cir.
2021).
223
224
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impact in the wider consumer financial protection context.230
Some circuits interpreted Spokeo narrowly to limit standing for
statutory violations, while others retained a broader
interpretation, allowing plaintiffs to seek judicial redress.231 Some
circuit courts, like the Seventh Circuit, took a strict approach of
“no harm, no foul.”232 Conversely, other courts, like the Second
Circuit, found that a more general risk of harm from a statutory
violation was sufficient to establish standing under Article III.233
The lack of clarity regarding standing after Spokeo left courts
confused and resulted in inconsistent holdings. For example, the
Seventh Circuit in Casillas deviated from the Sixth Circuit’s
holding in Macy, despite both cases presenting nearly identical
facts.234 More specifically, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an
omission giving rise to a risk of harm to an individual is not
sufficient to create standing; instead, it required a risk to the
plaintiffs themselves.235 The Eleventh Circuit in Trichell similarly
rejected the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Macy, as well as the Second
Circuit’s holding in Cohen, reasoning that “a statutory violation
that poses a risk of concrete harm to consumers in general, but
230 See Joshua Scott Olin, Note, Rethinking Article III Standing in Class Action
Consumer Protection Cases Following Spokeo v. Robins, 26 U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 69, 88
(2017) (noting that there are seventy-three federal consumer protection statutes, which,
prior to TransUnion, were all at risk “of becoming obsolete” and would provide a win for
corporations that wanted to avoid consumer lawsuits).
231 See discussion supra Part III.
232 See, e.g., Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., 926 F.3d 329, 331 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The
bottom line of our opinion can be succinctly stated: no harm, no foul.”).
233 See, e.g., Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., 897 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2018)
(holding that a “risk of real harm” can be sufficient to create Article III standing (citing
Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016))).
234 Compare Casillas v. Madison Ave. Assocs., 926 F.3d 329, 332, 339 (7th Cir. 2019)
(holding that a plaintiff debtor’s class action against her creditor’s alleged debt collector for
procedural violations of the FDCPA failed to satisfy the concreteness requirement for an
injury in fact necessary for Article III standing), with Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897
F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding that the plaintiffs “satisfied the concreteness prong
of the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing by alleging that [the defendant debt
collection agency’s] purported FDCPA violations created a material risk of harm to the
interests recognized by Congress in enacting the FDCPA”), abrogated by Ward v. Nat’l
Patient Acct. Servs. Sols., Inc., 9 F.4th 357 (6th Cir. 2021).
235 See Casillas, 926 F.3d at 336 (“It is certainly true that the omission put those
consumers who sought to dispute the debt at risk of waiving statutory rights. But it created
no risk for the plaintiffs in that case, who did not try (and, for that matter, expressed no
plans to try) to dispute the debt.”).
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not to the individual plaintiff, cannot fairly be described as
causing a particularized injury to the plaintiff.”236 Nonetheless,
the Eleventh Circuit in its original Hunstein opinion found a
statutory violation sufficient to confer standing.237 Although the
court attempted to reconcile its holdings in Trichell and
Hunstein,238 there remained an apparent discrepancy. The court
placed significant emphasis on congressional judgment in finding
a concrete injury in Hunstein, citing an interest in preventing
privacy invasions as part of the FDCPA’s purposes.239 By contrast,
the Eleventh Circuit seemingly ignored the FDCPA’s purpose of
“eliminat[ing] abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors”
when the court refused to find standing in Trichell.240 Conferring
standing on plaintiffs like those in Trichell, who were specifically
targeted by debt collectors’ abusive collection practices,241 would
directly support the statutory goal of eliminating such predatory
behavior.
Notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
TransUnion, the circuits still face ambiguity regarding the
requirements for standing in the context of statutory violations,
such as that of the FDCPA, resulting in continued inconsistencies
across the courts’ holdings. The Sixth Circuit completely shifted
its position on standing in Ward, finding that TransUnion
abrogated Macy’s holding that “plaintiffs satisfied the
concreteness requirement where ‘FDCPA violations created a

236 See Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 1002 (11th Cir. 2020)
(opining that the Seventh and D.C. Circuit opinions were “more faithful to Article III”).
237 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 994 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (11th
Cir.), rev’d, 17 F.4th 1016 (11th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 17
F.4th 1103 (11th Cir. 2021).
238 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
240 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (setting forth purposes of the FDCPA, including its aim to
“eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors”); Trichell, 964 F.3d at 1000
(“In sum, the FDCPA’s narrow findings and cause of action affirmatively cut against [the
plaintiffs] and, in any event, suggest no congressional judgment firm enough to break with
centuries of tradition indicating that misrepresentations are not actionable absent reliance
and ensuing damages.”).
241 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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material risk of harm to the interests recognized by Congress in
enacting the FDCPA.’”242
Meanwhile, as of this writing, the Second Circuit’s holding in
Cohen has not been abrogated, but in a Second Circuit decision
outside of the FDCPA context, the court held that the plaintiffs’
allegations “fail[ed] to support Article III standing, and that they
may not pursue their claims for the statutory penalties imposed
by the New York Legislature in federal court.”243 The court relied
heavily on TransUnion in finding that the plaintiffs did not suffer
a concrete harm because of the defendant bank’s alleged violation
of New York’s mortgage-satisfaction-recording statutes.244
Interestingly, the court made no mention of Cohen in this decision,
and Cohen remains good law as of this writing.245
The Eleventh Circuit’s divergent holdings in Trichell and
Hunstein also remain current law, even after the court reassessed
Hunstein. In its most recent Hunstein decision, the court again
attempted to reconcile its holding with that of Trichell, stating
that, “here—and unlike Trichell—the alleged harm fits neatly
within the ‘invasions of individual privacy’ that Congress
expressly addressed.”246 Still, the Eleventh Circuit again seemed
to ignore the FDCPA’s purpose of “eliminat[ing] abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors.”247 Contrary to the Eleventh
Circuit’s repeated conclusion about Trichell, the plaintiffs in that
case, who were specifically targeted by debt collectors’ abusive
collection practices,248 should have standing because this standing
would directly support the statutory goal of eliminating such
abusive behavior. Further supporting the argument that

242 Ward v. Nat’l Patient Acct. Servs. Sols., Inc., 9 F.4th 357, 361 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 761 (6th Cir. 2018), abrogated by Ward, 9
F.4th 357).
243 Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 19 F.4th 58, 60 (2d Cir. 2021).
244 Id. at 62–63 (“‘No concrete harm; no standing.’ This equation, which opens the
Supreme Court’s TransUnion decision, leaves little room for interpretation and may be
sufficient to resolve the issue before us.” (citation omitted) (quoting TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021))).
245 Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., 897 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2018).
246 Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 17 F.4th 1016, 1033 (11th Cir.)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 17 F.4th 1103
(11th Cir. 2021).
247 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).
248 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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TransUnion left courts confused are the Eleventh Circuit’s own
words. The court noted in its most recent Hunstein opinion that
“the question remains: If (as we now know for certain from
TransUnion) Article III doesn’t require a precise fit between an
alleged intangible harm and a common-law tort, what does it
require? The Supreme Court has never squarely answered that
question.”249 In the absence of important answers like these, the
U.S. Supreme Court is leaving it up to the circuits to come up with
their own interpretations, as the Eleventh Circuit did in
Hunstein.250
The inconsistent holdings among some of the circuits indicate
a lack of clarity regarding Article III standing in the context of
statutory violations, even after the U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt
to resolve this problem in TransUnion.
B. RETHINKING STANDING: A PROPOSAL TO GIVE DEFERENCE TO
CONGRESS

Apart from the existing inconsistencies among the circuits
regarding their interpretations of standing in the context of
statutory violations, TransUnion was wrongly decided, and a
broader approach giving deference to Congress would be more
consistent with Article III and Spokeo.
In Spokeo, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that statutory
violations can follow either of two distinct paths to establish
standing. Standing can be established where there is a “violation
of a procedural right granted by statute,” and the procedural
violation presents a “risk of real harm” so as to “satisfy the
requirement of concreteness.”251 Alternatively, where there is a
bare procedural violation, plaintiffs must “allege . . . additional
harm beyond the one identified by Congress” to establish
standing.252 The question that remained after Spokeo, which was
at the heart of the FDCPA standing circuit split, was whether
Congress embedded a procedural right in the various statutes at
issue to protect plaintiffs’ concrete interests so as to not require
Hunstein, 17 F.4th at 1024.
See id. (stating that “lower-court decisions—both our sister circuits’ and our own—
offer useful guidance” in answering that question).
251 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016).
252 Id.
249
250
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plaintiffs to prove additional harm to gain standing. The U.S.
Supreme Court attempted to answer that question in TransUnion,
holding that Congress “may not simply enact an injury into
existence, using its lawmaking power to transform something that
is not remotely harmful into something that is.”253 According to
the Court, even in the context of a statutory violation, a plaintiff
must still show a concrete injury to have standing.254
The Court’s ultimate holding in TransUnion contradicts its
holding in Spokeo, and Justice Thomas’s dissent holds truer to the
principle of separation of powers and the Court’s precedent
regarding Article III standing than the TransUnion majority’s
does. As Justice Thomas rightly argued in his dissent, the Court’s
decision in Spokeo “made clear that ‘Congress is well positioned to
identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III
requirements’ and explained that ‘the violation of a procedural
right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances
to constitute injury in fact.’”255 The majority directly contravened
the principle of separation of powers by moving Congress’s power
to create and define statutory rights into the hands of the
courts.256 Unlike what the majority holds, Justice Thomas was
correct in contending that “[w]eighing the harms caused by
specific facts and choosing remedies seems . . . like a much better
fit for legislatures and juries than for this Court.”257
Contrary to what the U.S. Supreme Court did in TransUnion,
the fundamental disagreements at play in the FDCPA circuit
split, and other standing disagreements regarding procedural
violations of different federal consumer financial protection
statutes, should be resolved by giving greater deference to
Congress. Congress generally enacts consumer protection statutes

253 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2205 (2021) (quoting Hagy v. Demers
& Adams, 882 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir. 2018)).
254 See id. (“Only those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant’s
statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in federal court.”).
255 Id. at 2220 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540,
1543–44 (2016)).
256 See id. at 2221 (“According to the majority, courts alone have the power to sift and
weigh harms to decide whether they merit the Federal Judiciary’s attention. In the name
of protecting the separation of powers this Court has relieved the legislature of its power
to create and define rights.” (citation omitted)).
257 Id. at 2224.
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for the purpose of protecting consumer interests.258 This goal
remains true even in the procedural components of such statutes;
for example, consumer plaintiffs may waive certain rights if they
are deceived or not fully informed of a statute’s procedural
requirements.259 This problem was demonstrated in the now
abrogated Macy case from the Sixth Circuit: Congress enacted
specific procedural requirements in the FDCPA for debt collectors
“‘to protect consumers’ . . . and ‘eliminate abusive debt collection
practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors
who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.’”260
With this purpose in mind, it should be clear that Congress
granted consumers a private right of action to protect their
concrete interests when it enacted the FDCPA. When a plaintiff
alleges an injury of the precise type of harm that a statute aimed
to prevent, that plaintiff should not be required to allege an
additional harm beyond the one identified by Congress, as the
Court alluded to in Spokeo.261 This congressional deference should
apply not only to procedural violations of the FDCPA but also in
the broader context of consumer protection financial statutory
violations.
Importantly, Congress is best positioned to identify concrete
harms sufficient to confer standing under Article III.262 As
societal, cultural, political, and technological shifts take place
258 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (explaining that the TILA aims to “assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the
various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect
the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices”); id. §
1692(e) (stating that the FDCPA aims to stop abusive debt collection practices and promote
uniform State action to protect consumers against such practices).
259 See, e.g., Macy v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 897 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir. 2018) (regarding
a statutory obligation for debt collection agencies to provide certain debt and creditor
information only if plaintiffs dispute their debts in writing), abrogated by Ward v. Nat’l
Patient Acct. Servs. Sols., Inc., 9 F.4th 357 (6th Cir. 2021).
260 Id. at 756 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e)).
261 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“[T]he violation of a
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute
injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm
beyond the one Congress has identified.”).
262 See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2226 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that “Congress is better suited than courts to” assess harms and risks of harms).
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across the country, it makes little sense for courts to rely on prior
caselaw to determine the concreteness of an injury or a risk
thereof.263 Although courts should not exclusively rely on
Congress’s judgment in making such determinations, courts
should consider the existence and purpose of procedural
requirements embedded within consumer financial protection
statutes.264 Given that congressional deference is not merely a
historical norm—indeed, Congress’s role as a factfinder is
embedded in the Constitution itself265—some courts’ lack of
deference to congressional factfinding is particularly troubling.
Apart from Congress’s constitutional role as a factfinder, Congress
is also better positioned than courts to identify and understand
the harms that arise from particular statutory violations.266
Courts often fail to consider the intangible or non-obvious harms
that may result from statutory violations, largely because “[f]actgathering on standing issues is structurally limited by the fact
that it is a jurisdictional inquiry and precedes any extensive
discovery efforts.”267 Moreover, although every case presents a
unique set of facts, courts’ decisions create binding precedent that
263 For example, technological advances allow debt collectors to gain easier access to
consumers, and in turn, consumers are more vulnerable to deception and false information.
264 Cf. Jackson Erpenbach, Note, A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of Intangible Harms, 118
MICH. L. REV. 471, 501–02 (2019) (“Courts have a tendency to convert a contingent factual
situation . . . into a hard-and-fast precedent. While the very nature of precedent binds
subsequent courts, Congress can act on the basis of future risks and determine that they
are sufficient to justify creation of a private cause of action.”).
265 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997) (“The Constitution gives
to Congress the role of weighing conflicting evidence in the legislative process.”); see also
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (opining that the
role of factfinding is “expressly assigned to [Congress] by the Constitution”).
266 See Erpenbach, supra note 264, at 500–01 (“Independent of calculating risk, courts
may also simply misunderstand the harms that result from particular statutory
violations. . . . Notably, the Court itself fails to appreciate its narrow factfinding
capabilities. One of the most-cited lines from Spokeo is the Court’s dicta stating that an
incorrect zip code is clearly ‘a bare procedural violation’ resulting in no attendant concrete
injury. Yet it is not difficult to identify harms that could result from an erroneous zip code.
For example, research shows that employers discriminate against job applicants based on
the zip codes that appear on their resumes. Reporting an incorrect zip code can lead to
misdirected mail or even affect the credit options or prices for services available to
consumers.” (footnotes omitted)).
267 See id. (contending that courts often lack the necessary knowledge to make an
informed decision about whether a plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of a statutory
violation).
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can limit future victims’ abilities to recover on other consumer
financial protection statutory violations when these precedents
are read to foreclose entire groups of consumers from relief.
Because courts are strictly bound by precedent and because
Congress has a deeper understanding of the reasons behind the
content of consumer financial protection statutes, Congress is
better positioned than the courts to identify potential risks to
consumers and to create a private cause of action for plaintiffs
based on that risk.
Last, increasing deference to Congress will not only serve to
protect consumers from abusive practices by predatory companies
that pose a threat to consumers but also to increase consistency
among the courts in determining whether an injury is concrete
enough to satisfy Article III standing.268 Today, even after
TransUnion, Article III standing in actions arising out of
consumer financial protection statutory violations is essentially
determined by the jurisdiction in which a plaintiff litigates; this
clash in standing doctrines is made evident by the ongoing FDCPA
circuit split examined above.269 Allowing courts to forego
congressional deference inevitably will lead to inconsistent
holdings in the context of consumer financial protection statutory
violations, creating unfair outcomes for some plaintiffs trapped in
forums with narrow standing doctrines. Instead, deferring to
Congress when making injury determinations for purposes of
standing will increase consistency among the courts, in turn
enhancing reliability, predictability, and efficiency in actions
involving these statutory violations.270
Notably, increasing congressional deference would be more
consistent with the Court’s holding in Spokeo. Spokeo laid out a
two-part framework for assessing standing, which requires courts
to look to both history and Congress’s judgment.271 This
268 See id. at 503–04 (arguing that deferring to Congress will produce more consistency
among judicial holdings because, left to their own devices, courts will use different
analytical tools that can produce inconsistent outcomes).
269 See discussion supra Section VI.A.
270 See Erpenbach, supra note 264, at 504–05 (“A deferential stance would produce fairer,
more predictable outcomes for those that Congress saw fit to protect.”).
271 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“Because the doctrine of
standing derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and because that requirement
in turn is grounded in historical practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as
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framework, however, does not require courts to assess alleged
harms within the limited scope that TransUnion endorses and
that some courts have applied.272 By contrast, courts like the
Second Circuit have more faithfully applied Spokeo’s two-part
framework to find alleged injuries to be sufficiently concrete when
there is a statutory violation and a risk of harm to interests
specifically recognized by Congress.273 In sum, courts should
engage in congressional deference because deference would better
align with Spokeo’s holding—which specifically calls for
consideration of history and congressional judgment274—when
compared to TransUnion, which instructs courts to ignore
Congress’s power to create and define rights by holding “for the
first time, that a specific class of plaintiffs whom Congress allowed
to bring a lawsuit cannot do so under Article III.”275

VII. CONCLUSION
Although it is not yet clear what impacts TransUnion will have
on consumer financial protection, the U.S. Supreme Court
decision is already making it more difficult for victims to sue
corporations for statutory violations of federal consumer financial
protection laws. These additional barriers to redress for
consumers were revealed by the circuit courts’ reactions to
TransUnion in the context of standing for violations of the
FDCPA, in which all circuits, except for the Second Circuit, held

providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts. In addition, because
Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III
requirements, its judgment is also instructive and important.” (citation omitted)).
272 See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2214 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Yet despite Congress’ judgment that such misdeeds deserve redress, the majority decides
that TransUnion’s actions are so insignificant that the Constitution prohibits consumers
from vindicating their rights in federal court. The Constitution does no such thing.”).
273 See Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., 897 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
that a “risk of real harm” can be sufficient to create Article III standing where a statutory
violation is found (citing Strubel v. Comenity Bank, 842 F.3d 181, 190 (2d Cir. 2016))).
274 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 at 1549 (“In determining whether an intangible harm
constitutes injury in fact, both history and the judgment of Congress play important
roles.”).
275 See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Court here
transforms standing law from a doctrine of judicial modesty into a tool of judicial
aggrandizement.”).
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that consumer plaintiffs did not allege a sufficiently concrete and
particularized injury in fact, as Article III standing requires.276
As Spokeo, TransUnion, and the standing doctrine continue to
cause confusion and disagreement among courts, reform is needed
to increase courts’ deference to Congress in identifying what
constitutes a concrete injury for purposes of Article III standing.
Consumer protection statutes exist for the primary purpose of
protecting consumers.277 Accordingly, when a consumer alleges an
injury due to a procedural violation of a statute embedded with a
private right of action and enacted for the purpose of preventing
such an injury, that consumer should have standing under Article
III. With the current lack of clarity and consistency in courts’
interpretations of Spokeo, and now TransUnion, consumers
alleging procedural violations under federal consumer financial
protection statutes will likely continue to face significant
challenges when proceeding through the courts. Further, shifting
the role of defining an injury worthy of standing to Congress will
allow for more judicial consistency and provide for a better
representation of modern cultural, political, societal, and
technological issues posing harm, or a real risk of harm, to
American consumers.

See discussion supra Part V (discussing shifts in some of the circuit courts’ positions
on standing after TransUnion).
277 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
276
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